Does the End of History Theory Possess Any Positive or Normative Value?

In The Philosophy of History, Hegel created the notion of the conclusion of history. According to Hegel,

history is guided by the logic of the increase of human freedom through time. In a protracted period of historical development, the acceptance of autocrats’ human superiority in conquering others and turning them into slaves was progressively replaced by the dialectical acknowledgement of both groups as humans with dignity. The abolition of human society’s adversarial two-class structure fosters human liberty and social cohesiveness. As a political form, history in Germany stopped during Hegel’s lifetime. Marx’s conception of the end of history differed from Hegel’s due to his emphasis on output. According to Marx, the outcome of history as a political or economic form is communism, since communism is much more productive than capitalism. Fukuyama is credited for modernizing the concept of the end of history. In his book titled The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama argues that history as a political form came to an end in the United States or the West in the early 1990s. Fukuyama’s conclusion is supported in part by Hegel’s theory of recognition and in part by the fall of the political regimes in the erstwhile communist nations of Eastern Europe.

According to Hegel, the end of history as a political or social form in Germany occurs during the period of early capitalism with restricted suffrage.

Fukuyama goes even farther, arguing that democracy, as a political structure that incorporates contestation and inclusivity, represents the end of history. Marx, on the other hand, considers communism to be the end of history. It goes without saying that neither mutual recognition nor the eradication of class conflict are sufficient to support the idea. Second, each of the three reaches a conclusion as if it were inevitable. People in the modern world no longer see the early capitalism with restricted suffrage as a political structure during Hegel’s time as the end of history. Obviously, Marx comes to a different conclusion. The issue with Marx is that communism is inevitable. Communism is an idealistic concept. Above importantly, the transition from capitalism to communism in history is not inevitable. It is similarly unclear how communist countries will achieve success when they transition from the private property system of capitalist societies to the public ownership of the means of production in communist society. So far, the data has failed to demonstrate the advantages of economic planning and public ownership of the means of production. According to Fukuyama, the political form at the end of history must be contestable and inclusive. According to Fukuyama, the political structure that existed in the United States or the West at the start of the 1990s signifies the end of history. However, neither science nor philosophy guarantees that result. Finally, all three authors arrive at their findings with just incomplete data. Each is restricted by the facts and knowledge of his time. None of them take the nature of future technologies and/or organizations, which will have considerable effects on information collecting and the lowering of transaction costs associated with creating alternative political regimes, seriously into account.

I have argued elsewhere that the economic and human development of Japan, Singapore,

and China is determined by open access in the economic sphere and institutional development related to the protection of property rights and contract enforcement, the financial market, the rule of law, and the accumulation of human resources. I have also claimed that Britain and China followed the same route of growth following the Glorious Revolution in Britain in 1688 and the Open-Door Policy in China in 1978, respectively. The major distinction between the United Kingdom and China is the cooperation of elites. In Britain, the coordination of elites via Parliament played a crucial role in the movement toward free access in the economic sector and institutional development. In contrast, elite coordination inside the Chinese Communist Party had a significant role in changing economic access and institutional development. If my interpretation is accurate, there is currently no way to conjecture or predict the end of history as a political form. In contrast, it is more probable that my theory will lead to the conclusion that there are different equilibriums in terms of political regimes in creating open access in the economic sector and in developing institutions to promote open access in the economic sphere.